Compared to 4000 kilometres of Indo-Bangladesh border that runs along Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, in the Indo-Myanmar border stretches over 1,643 kilometres and passes along four states of the Northeast- Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh. The Union Government claims to have fenced almost 70 percent of the Indo-Bangladesh border in the last two decades. In contrast, only 52 kilometres of this international border is manned (not fenced) by Indian security forces. Reports in January 2009 indicate that the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has been assigned the task of fencing 10 kilometres of the Indo-Myanmar border in Manipur. As a result, vast stretches of the border, in reality, remain only imaginary demarcations between two sovereign countries, prone to be violated by the unhindered movement of militants and weapons.

Boundaries in the erstwhile British colonies have been artificially drawn and have often generated problems rather than providing solutions. Just like the Indo-Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) border, the Indo-Myanmar border too has divided tribes and ethnicities. This, in effect, has given rise to insurgency movements, many of which demand unification of their divided homelands by way of dissolution of these artificial boundaries. The failure of the countries to demarcate the border for decades has further aggravated the problems.

Ethnic linkages across the Indo-Myanmar border allowed the Mizo, Naga as well as Manipuri insurgent outfits to find safe haven in Myanmar. The Sagaing division of Myanmar, for decades has been home to a number of insurgent outfits from Nagaland and Manipur. In fact, the safety provided by these sanctuaries in Myanmar has remained a crucial factor behind the intractable conflicts in states like Manipur and Nagaland. Security force operations in these states have achieved limited success in the face of the ability of the militants to take an escape route to Myanmar.

For the Myanmar authorities, the border regions with India are ungoverned spaces. Busy with consolidating its hold over the country in the face of a yearning for democracy, the military junta in Myanmar has adopted a policy of compromise with many of the warring tribes inhabiting these regions. Most of the tribes have rarely been disturbed by the military which has never attempted to extend its administrative structure to these regions. As a result, these tribes have been a law onto themselves indulging in rampant drug and weapons trade, which naturally overflows into the geographically contiguous Indian Northeastern region of India.

Security forces allege that Chinese weapons are being smuggled into Manipur via Myanmar. Fake Indian currencies are also smuggled across the border from Myanmar, which is also the route for narcotics smuggling.

Similarly, the border area, at best, is a neglected frontier for India. Media reports in January 2009 indicated that villagers residing in the Manipur sector of the Indo-Myanmar border, in districts such as Churachandpur, Chandel and Ukhrul, have been practically surviving all these years without any assistance from the side of the Government. Benefits of the various developmental schemes have never reached these places. These villages have no access to water and electricity and are neither connected by motorable roads or any mode of communication. Letters reach their destination only after two months of dispatch. The plight is such that even the security force personnel belonging to the 10 JK Light Infantry located at Yangoulen have been employing three persons paying Rupees 3000 each every month just for fetching water.

An agreement for maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border areas was signed between India and Myanmar on January 29, 1994 for enhancing cooperation in various issues of mutual concern, including those relating to security, drug trafficking, border management and border trade. However, the Indo-Myanmar relations have refused to take off, in spite of the so called bonhomie generated during bilateral visits of ministers or military officials between the two countries. On the economic front, Myanmar’s exports to India during 2006-07 amounted to Rs. 2934 crores and India’s exports to Myanmar amounted to Rs. 640 crores. This, at best, is a miniscule trade, not villagers residing in the Manipur sector of the Indo-Myanmar border, in districts such as Churachandpur, Chandel and Ukhrul, have been practically surviving all these years without any assistance from the side of the Government conforming to the trade potential between the two countries.

A parliamentary delegation headed by the Vice-President Hamid Ansari in February 2009 visited Myanmar on a three-day visit. During the trip the delegation was apparently assured by the military officials of Myanmar of co-operation to tackle militant activities in that country. However, assurances of this nature have rarely been followed up by consistent action by the Myanmarese authorities. Intermittent operations by the Myanmarese military have targeted the militant facilities since the 1980s. Such area clearing operations have rarely been followed up by a strategy been followed up by a strategy to hold the area. As a result, once the military withdraws from these inhospitable terrains to the safety of their barracks, the militants have reclaimed their facilities. Intelligence reports also indicate linkages between the lower rung cadres of the Myanmarese army and the militants. The militants are tipped off of an impending operation in exchange of gifts such as motorcycles and jeeps, thus nullifying even the temporary gains that such operations seek to achieve.

The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Facility that envisages connectivity between Indian ports on the eastern seaboard and Sittwe Port in Myanmar thereby providing an alternate route for transport of goods to North - East India through Myanmar, is yet to take off. In 2005, Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Chinese oil company, Petro China for supply of natural gas from Block A-1 offshore oil fields, in spite of the best efforts of the Indian companies to secure the rights.

Such consistent failure to secure its interests in Myanmar along with a poor border management policy has put serious question marks over the future of the much-talked about Look-East Policy. The policy’s proponents vociferously argue that it will dramatically transform the economy of the northeast. However, given the state of militancy in states like Manipur and the chaos along the Indo-Myanmar border, the Look-East Policy would not achieve anything significant if it is to take off without a drastic improvement in the ground level security situation.

China has a significant presence in Myanmar and has shaped its policies to a great extent. In contrast, India’s Myanmar policy remains torn between the latter’s moral obligation to support the democracy movement and the real politik of dealing with the military junta. As a result, India houses thousands of Myanmarese pro-democracy supporters in its cities including in the national capital New Delhi, while supplying military hardware to the Myanmrese junta. Thus, both the junta and the pro-democracy activists remain wary of India’s intentions. India has consistently failed to gain a foothold in Myanmar.

This calls for a rethinking and possible reorientation of India’s Myanmar policy. The action plan for India should, thus, include:

(i) Giving up the ambiguity over the relationship with the military junta by stopping to support the pro-democracy forces in that country. It needs to be realised that the junta is the de facto as well as de jure government in Yangoon and this reality will not undergo change in the near future.

(ii) Emphasise on the management of the Indo-Myanmar border with an urgent level of seriousness. Militancy in states like Manipur and Nagaland will receive a setback if India effectively manages to control the movement along the Indo-Myanmar border.

(iii) India needs to assist Myanmar to secure its authority over its border areas. Myanmar’s control over these areas will be directly proportional to India’s ability to gain control over militancy in states like Manipur.

(iv) Joint military operations must be planned with the Myanmarese forces. To augment the capacity of the Myanmarese forces, India may provide Myanmar with military hardware and training.

(v) Encourage the state of Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh to create separate departments for the development of the border regions. Adequate funds should be provided to these departments directly from the centre.

India must seek to establish its dominance along the Indo-Myanmar border region with the objective of neutralising the advantages enjoyed by the militants for years.

The Union Government claims to have fenced almost 70 percent of the Indo-Bangladesh border in the last two

decades. In contrast, only 52 kms of this international border is manned (not fenced) by Indian security forces.