The NSCN-IM, on January 12, declared a “state of emergency” in Nagaland in opposition to the imposition of President’s rule nine days earlier. The ‘chairman’ of the outfit, Isak Chisi Swu, declared, “In exercise of the powers conferred upon me by clause (h), Article 3, of part III of the Yehzabo (constitution), I, Isak Chisi Swu, Yaruiwo (‘president’) of the Republic of Nagalim, by this proclamation, declare that an emergency exists.” He added, “In view of the precarious situation in Nagalim, which increasingly threatens peace and normal state of affairs… Henceforth, the state of affairs shall be conducted by the National Security Council until further orders.” An unnamed functionary of the outfit clarified, “President’s rule has been imposed to dominate the Naga people and this has to be countered by the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagalim (GPRN).”

President’s rule declared in the State on January 3, 2008, dismissed the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN) coalition Government, two months before it was due to complete its five-year term. The Union Cabinet’s recommendation to the effect came after the DAN Government, headed by Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio, managed to cling to office even after losing a no-confidence vote moved by the Opposition on December 13, 2007. A controversial decision by the Speaker of the Nagaland Assembly, K. Peseyie, barring three independent Legislators from voting in the no-confidence motion and declaring as invalid the votes of nine ruling Nagaland People’s Front (NPF) Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) for defying a party whip, had helped Rio to continue as Chief Minister. Even though Rio made prolonged ‘murder of democracy’ noises following his dismissal, New Delhi’s decision appeared to have come as a blessing in disguise for his immensely forgettable Government. Elections to the State Legislative Assembly are scheduled to be held on March 5, and Rio can now hope to ride on a sympathy wave to overcome the strong anti-incumbency factor in the polls.

The declaration of an ‘emergency’ by an armed militant group, on the other hand, is unheard of, even from the NSCN-IM, which enjoys near-total domination over the affairs of the State. The ‘emergency’ has expectedly generated, a great deal of curiosity regarding the ascendancy of the military wing of the NSCN-IM over the political wing and the sort of the challenge that the outfit could pose to President’s rule in the State in the coming months. Some analysts have projected the outbreak of violence between the insurgents and the Security Forces and an abrogation of the ceasefire agreement, which has been in place since 1997.

Despite the projected rationale for the declaration of ‘emergency’, the NSCN-IM’s move has little to do with the political implications of the imposition of President’s rule in the State. Unsurprisingly, the outfit’s initial reaction was to ‘wait and watch’ political developments in the State. The subsequent declaration of ‘emergency’ is, in fact, a desperate attempt to keep the NSCN-IM’s brittle house in order, in the face of a serious challenge posed by the Sema tribe through what is now come to be known as the ‘Niuland Declaration’ of November 2007.

On November 23, 2007, armed cadres and some senior functionaries of both the NSCN-IM and the rival Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) converged at Hovishe under the Niuland sub-division in the Dimapur District at a meeting chaired by Hokiye, President of the Western Sumi Hoho. The NSCN-IM was led by ‘Kilo-Kilonser’ (Home Minister) Azheto Chophy and the NSCN-K by ‘Kilonser’ (Cabinet Minister) C. Singson. An inter-factional ‘truce agreement’ was signed at the meet, declaring the unification of both warring factions a common goal. A new group, NSCN-Unification, was thus born, stationed at Vihokhu, 25 kilometres from the commercial township of Dimapur. NSCN-U has reportedly established contact with New Delhi and is expecting formal recognition.

The unification move was, however, not palatable to the NSCN-IM higher command consisting of Chairman Isak Chisi Swu and General Secretary Thuingaleng Muivah, who have steadfastly remained opposed to any truce with the NSCN-K. On the night of November 23, within a few hours of the signing of the Niuland Declaration, NSCN-IM sources said that the declaration was made without the knowledge of the group’s ‘higher authority’ and hence was unacceptable. Subsequently, on December 21, Thuingaleng Muivah described those involved in the Niuland conglomeration as “unprincipled”, “spineless workers” and a “crowd which has nothing to do with the politics of unity.” Over the following days, the outfit issued a barrage of accusations targeting the cadres and leaders who attended the meet, the Sumi Hoho (apex body of the Sema tribe), the Sumi Church leaders who blessed the occasion and the Indian Government who, the group alleges, is attempting to split the organisation. The outfit also suspended Azheto Chophy, accusing him of being involved in a number of abduction and extortion cases in and around Dimapur.

Notwithstanding the role allegedly played by the Security Agencies in propping up the nascent NSCN-U, it remains the case that the NSCN-IM is gradually being dominated by the Tangkhul tribe, to which General Secretary Muivah belongs. The tribe has a marginal presence in Nagaland and is mostly based in the hill District of Ukhrul in neighbouring Manipur. The ascendancy of a tribe that has insignificant numerical strength in Nagaland, has created consternation within the ranks of the militant group, who are drawn from several tribes. Rampant and undiscriminating violence by NSCN-IM cadres targeting civilians of several tribes and the top leadership’s defence of such activities, has provoked extreme resentment. On January 13, 2007, for instance, two civilians, Pangai Konyak and Phoba Konyak, were killed by NSCN-IM militants in Kohima. The NSCN-IM claimed that the duo were NSCN-K cadres, a charge which was refuted by the Konyak Union (the apex body of the Konyak Tribe). The Konyak Union’s demand to punish the involved cadres went unheeded. A few days later, on January 31, 2007, the Sumi Hoho demanded the dismissal of ‘Maj Gen’ Markson, the ‘deputy commander in chief’ of the NSCN-IM, for his alleged role in the plot to assassinate former Sumi Hoho president Huska Yepthomi. Once again, the outfit refused to take any such action.

Many such episodes, however, were kept under wraps as a result of the timely intervention of the NSCN-IM top leadership, who command some respect among most tribes. Both Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu, then based abroad, were largely seen as non-partisan, and corrective measures initiated by them had considerable impact on inter-tribal relations. However, both the leaders are now based in Nagaland, barring occasional foreign sojourns and are consequently seen as party, not just to the activities of their cadres, but also to the systemic undermining of the recalcitrant tribes. Their statements and interventions now have diminishing impact in terms of assuaging the hurt feelings of these tribes.

Nevertheless, the recent effort at uniting the rival outfits is expected to achieve its desired results. The NSCN-U may not also be able to pose a significant challenge to the NSCN-IM, since the former is openly blessed by the NSCN-K and would, consequently, remain anathema for the fence-sitting cadres within the NSCN-IM. Additionally, both Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu remain more or less unchallenged within the outfit and continue to be supported by a trusted band of senior and middle level militants.

What is worrisome for Nagaland, however, is the prospect of the intensification of the internecine clashes between the NSCN-IM on the one hand and the NSCN-K and NSCN-U on the other. The NSCN-IM would find it expedient to teach both the factions a ‘lesson’ in order to pre-empt any possibility of further splits within its own ranks. An indication of such a scenario emerging was provided by the NSCN-IM attack on an NSCN-K camp on January 14 at Longmisa village under Mokokchung District, which resulted in the death of three NSCN-K cadres.

Over 150 fatalities including 45 civilians were reported in 2007 in Nagaland. New Delhi, for years, has remained a silent spectator to continuous internecine insurgent violence in Nagaland, and there is little likelihood that the recent developments would bring about any alternation in such a policy. The creation of the NSCN-U, with or without its tacit support, signifies the weakening of NSCN-IM and for New Delhi’s negotiation team with the outfit nothing can be a better development.