However, the situation has remained quiescent since then, if tense. Some weeks ago, KLO supporters organized a protest/bandh programme in lower Assam areas in support of their demand for a separate state. Observers find this unusual, because their activities are directed more against the ruling establishment of West Bengal. As a result, there is hardly much of a stir in Assam, the main reason for this being the linkage of the KLO with the banned ULFA of Assam.
It (KLO) is the weakest component of the trinity comprising KLO- ULFA-NDFB axis, and is yet to strike deep organisational roots in left-ruled Bengal. Its activities began during the nineties. There is little doubt that the “Operation All Clear” some years ago in Bhutan, left them shelterless, depleted and weakened.
The KLO is heavily dependent on the ULFA for its cadre training, arms acquisition and its existence. In Southern Bhutan, it had 430 cadres, led by Tom Adhikary, putting up in five camps. Adhikary was arrested, some cadres were killed, while their cache of arms were mostly captured. Prior to the operation, the KLO had carried out selected kidnapping, arson, killing at least 20 people, mostly belonging to the CPI (M).
It was in 1993 that some members of the All Kamtapur Students” Union (AKSU) contacted leaders of the banned ULFA in Kokrajhar district seeking support for their movement for a separate state. The ULFA leaders agreed and initially 12 youths were trained in arms in Bhutan, according to intelligence reports. However, their programme could not be completed. Sporadic contacts continued and by 1995, the ULFA suggested that as with itself and the NDFB for the Bodos, Rajbonsghis should float a “secessionist” outfit, even as the parliamentary Kamtapuri peoples’ Party continued its activities. ULFA leaders also saw the benefits from a tie-up with Kamtapuris: under intense pressure in Assam, the organization could count on a safe area in North Bengal, enjoying shelter and medical facilities. In 1995 the KLO was set up with its headquarters in the Somdrup Jhonkar district of South Bhutan. At a time, about 100 youths were trained. There were three batches of Kamtapuri supporters undergoing training in Bhutan and Jalpaiguri, under the ULFA control, around April—July 2000. The KLO could set up operational areas in Jalpaiguri, Siliguri and Alipurduar under guidance from the ULFA its cadres could handle explosives, carry out sabotage such as blasts on trains and tracks, extortion and selected killings. Apart from attacking local CPI (M) leaders, the KLO also targeted tea plantations and business men for extortion.
Now that the ULFA itself is under pressure, forced out of its Bhutan sanctuary and seeking talks with the government, coordination between the three outfits has suffered. The ULFA is trying to regroup and stage a comeback, but observers say it will not find recovery easy.
In contrast with the ULFA and the NDFB which operate in Assam and parts of the Northeast, the KLO has the most difficult battle at hand : it is up against the political and organisational might of the ruling Left front in West Bengal, enjoying power with massive popular support for over 30 years.
For all its drawbacks, the CPI (M), which heads the LF, is among the most effectively organised parties in India, now enjoying considerable political leverage at the centre as well. Governance and administration in West Bengal differ markedly from the way they are conducted in Assam or the Northeast.
Just how is it different, for an insurgent organisation, to operate in West Bengal , from other states? The answer is simple. The CPI (M) and to a much lesser extent its allies like the CPI, Forward Bloc and the RSP, not only control the administration, they also maintain highly effective mass organisations in all the districts .
These multi-tier organizations among peasants, women, students, government employees, central government employees, civic workers, retired persons, teachers in schools and colleges, were not built in a day. They were set up when the left was in opposition from 1947 to 1977 and nurtured effectively up to the present. In the rural areas, these organisations are the left’s tentacles among the poor and the struggling, the sullen, silent majority.
Over the years, some corruption has crept in the functioning of these mass organizations, which interfere even in areas where they are unwanted. They unnecessarily politicise the educational atmosphere in schools and colleges, they encourage nepotism and corruption under the party banner. But importantly, such organizations help the left parties maintain close links with the common people on a daily basis. Except the Bharatiya Janata party in parts of North India, no other party can boast such close contact with the people at grassroot level.
In the North Bengal context, the “poor” and “the economically backward” have come to mean the tribes, settled communities and smaller ethnic groups. Among them, the CPI (M) and other left parties have a support base that they share with the Kamtapuri organisations. The KLO or the parliamentary group KPP (Kamtapuri Peoples’ Party), cannot claim to represent the Rajbongshis as a whole. There are any number of Rajbongshis in the left mass organizations as well. In elections at various levels, the KPP for instance, has never garnered more than 7% of the aggregate vote in North Bengal districts!
This is not an advantage the Congress or the AGP in Assam can count on. Both parties have insignificant support among the Bodos, the Misings, the Karbis or the Rajbongshis, the Congress somewhat more than the AGP.
In political terms, this makes it difficult for outfits like the ULFA or the NDFB to introduce and foster an ethnic-based insurgency into West Bengal. It would have been easier in Bihar or Uttar Pradesh, where the political culture of maintaining mass organisations at the grassroots never really caught on. Unlike the domination of ethnicities, the political space was left clear for caste forces.
There are other contrasts between the North East political culture and Bengal’s. In both areas, mass agitations have been carried out by large groups of people complaining of long economic neglect and exploitation. But in Bengal, the ruling left parties have spearheaded such agitations, not the Congress. And they have always tried to mobilise the largest number of people in such agitations against the opposition. This was always done without any consideration of religion, ethnic background, or creed.
Thus, in India, insurgencies always focus on the grievances of particular ethnic groups, with their separate political agendas. They do not talk of working for the uplift of the entire community, a la the left parties. In a different context, this also explains why the Naxalite movement, which started from North Bengal and flourished for some time, eventually failed while it has survived elsewhere in India. The roots of left movement among the people in Bengal run deep.
Insurgent bodies like the KLO therefore, could never claim a monopoly of Rajbongshi support. Nor can the KPP which fared miserably in the elections in which it has participated, which proves the point about separatists not representing their entire community. Earlier the KLO and the KPP enjoyed close links, which made better political sense strategically. The Rajbongshis could ventilate their legitimate grievances at two levels, parliamentary and extra parliamen

tary.

However, KPP leader Atul Roy later announced that his party would not have any truck with other parties claiming to help the Rajbongshis. This is the position officially although seasoned left leaders do not take Roy’s stand at face value.

To deal with the economic side first, there can be no dispute that the settled tribes and indigenous people in the North Bengal districts have fared badly in the post-independence race for development. Waves of refugees from East Pakistan swamped them and their tranquil life style, to the point that they felt marginalised in their own home-ground.

Occasional surveys among the North Bengal population by central and other agencies have always revealed the problems faced by Rajbongshis and the tribes. A Health department survey in 1999 showed that 70% of women in Coochbehar suffered from critical physical deficiencies and weaknesses at pregnancy. Among the children, 42% suffered from malnutrition. Unemployment was rampant.

The political fallout from such systemic neglect of entire communities has been inevitable : A senior state police official told newsmen on December 10, 2000 that "Jobless Rajbongshi youths were being recruited as KLO cadres!"

Naxalite leader Kanu Sanyal concedes that owing to urbanisation and the rampant growth of tea cultivation, many Rajbongshi farmers have been uprooted from their land! Most of their economic grievances against the state and central governments were justified, admit other observers. Even left leaders agree that when the Rajbongshis demand better economic facilities and more development for North Bengal, who can argue with them? "They are 52% of North Bengal’s population, which is about 20% of the population of the state as a whole," said one leader.

The Left Front can certainly be faulted on grounds of inefficiency, mismanagement, corruption in the panchayats and nepotism, but they cannot be accused of neglecting the poor or the tribals as a class. In Tripura the Left Front had given the Tribal autonomous Council powers that no other tribal-dominated body enjoys in the Northeast. And in North Bengal what is the record ?

The region has only 7292 primary schools in 1975-76, which rose to 9472 by 1999. The number of secondary schools rose from 548 to 1074 during the same period. As against 38 colleges in 1985, North Bengal had 68 colleges out of 327 in West Bengal in 1998. . In terms of per capita expenditure in rural schemes, North Bengal received Rs 120 as against Rs 71 for the other districts of the state. Per capita expenditure for drinking water schemes was Rs 19 for North Bengal as against Rs 12.5 for all other districts.

By 1998-99, again, the monthly per expenditure per person in the state plan was Rs 42.82 in North Bengal as against Rs 18.04 for the rest. Is this economic neglect or exploitation ? Later figures are not readily available, but the trend has not been reversed.

However, Rajbongshis are on firmer ground when they accuse the South Bengal people of cultural discrimination. Not only is the distinct culture of the North Bengal districts, their handicrafts, music and literature, not duly publicised in the south-based official media, even text books do not carry any mention of the glorious history of Cooch Behar, the rich life and legacy of King Naranarayan, the magnificence of the royal house of Cooch Behar and its palace. The same can be said or Murshidabad town and district, which once boasted of being the capital of undivided Bengal. .

It is only of late that official media has taken some steps to improve the situation, but privately controlled media is not interested. Clearly much more needs to be done, and on a sustained basis, to bring North Bengal closer to the South.

In other words, for state and central governments, the battle against separatist bodies like the KLO must be fought at two levels, namely, the political as well as the administrative/cultural levels. Retaliation alone will never be the answer. The economic exploitation and cultural alienation among Rajbonghis must be addressed by the ruling Left Front. It may become necessary for the Left to find a new political rhetoric, now that North Bengal is attracting industrial investment in the post-liberalisation period. It has to be admitted that the left as a whole is not yet geared to meet the challenge that confronts it in North Bengal.