These Islands can be used as listening and staging posts. Therefore, the region is fiercely contested over by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei and the Philippines, which collectively form the SCS littoral. Overlapping claims to the territorial waters of the SCS and its islands threaten to turn the region into a flashpoint of global conflict. Ever since the withdrawal of US forces from the Philippines in 1991, China has consistently laid claims to the entire sea. China’s assertiveness has now turned bellicose and overbearing against the backdrop of its growing appetite for energy and fishery resources.

 

In 1974, China seized the Paracel Islands from the crumbling South Vietnamese regime. It later took over the Spratly Islands from Vietnam and the Mischeef Reef from the Philippines in 1995. Pag-Asa is the biggest in a cluster of the Spratly Islands that the Philippines claims as its own. In 1998, a skirmish between China and Vietnam over the Johnson South Reef led to the deaths of over 70 Vietnamese sailors. There is an ongoing tussle between China, Taiwan and the Philippines over the Malampaya and Campago gas fields. China steadily and subtly consolidated its hold over these priceless maritime assets by intimidation and coercion. In recent months, there has been a spate of violent flare-ups between China on one side and Vietnam and the Philippines on the other over issues of harnessing of marine resources. The most chilling incident this year was that of May 26, wherein a maritime security vessel of China cut the cables of an oil exploration ship near the Cam Ranh Bay-a strategic naval base in the Vietnamese coast - in violation of the 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS ) charter, which declares, “Freedom of the high seas is to comprise inter alia freedom of navigation, of overflights , of laying cables and pipelines and of fishing and scientific research, subject to the provision of parts vi and viii.” Even China had ratified the charter in 1996. But it would be pertinent to note that China has refrained from any meddling with the right to transit and overflights in the SCS. At an ASEAN meeting in Bali, China even agreed to the guidelines that form the basis of an impending draft on the final code of conduct in the sea. Secretary Clinton had also emphasized US’ interest to play a mediatory role among the warring states to propose a collective and collaborative approach for a permanent solution. In 2009, the US offered a pact of “strategic reassurance” to China, in which America would welcome China’s “peaceful rise” if it would be transparent in its aims and objectives of the rapid and robust military build-up, but the pact is yet to take off. China is incensed over anything that is detrimental to its interests – real or perceived. It may be recalled that in 2008, China tried to halt Exxon and BP’s oil exploration bids off Vietnam.

 

For India to establish itself as a ‘no-pushover’, an integrated approach between military and diplomacy backed by an unflagging political mandate is a crying need of the hour.

In March 2010, China told America that the SCS is part of its “core interests” and so, ‘non-negotiable.’ Beijing’s ploy is to gradually erode the credibility of US’ security guarantees to its East Asian security dependents. It seeks to undercut US’  power projection capabilities by the so-called “anti-access and area denial” strategy which is based on the use of a wide array of options like sea-skimming missiles, stealthier submarines, anti-ship ballistic missiles, space and cyber warfare capabilities and ground-based satellite blinders to interdict or destroy hostile ships and bases operating near China’s coastline. To add more teeth to this unfolding strategy, the development of a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent is a doctrinal imperative for China, which believes that only such a form of deterrence can keep the US-Japan alliance, which often conduct joint anti-submarine warfare operations in the nearby waters of the Philippine Sea, on a tight leash. China’s recent acquisition of the aircraft carrier Varayag, renamed Shilang, from Ukraine and the development of the Jin class SSBN’s - PLAN’s (PLA Navy’s) second generation ballistic nuclear ship - is the bedrock of this strategy. Such developments threaten US naval supremacy in the crucial Southeast Asian theatre. The rise of a countervailing force that could impinge on its superpower status is anathema to the US.

 

Weary of the Chinese Navy’s intentions, the Philippines and Vietnam have gravitated towards the US. They are holding joint war games with the US and sharing intelligence. Vietnam is making forays into the various sectors of the Cambodian economy and expanding trade relations to counter the Chinese dominance in its neighborhood. The Philippines sent a congressional delegation to the Pag-Asa Island to assert its sovereignty. Beijing has not defined clearly the basis of its territorial claim to the SCS. Only a dubious map of 1940 shows that the entire sea belongs to China. Beijing’s control over the SCS would not only mean control over its rich and bountiful resources but also control of the crucial trade routes to Japan and South Korea. The dispute involves Chinese claim of sovereignty not only over the island territories, but also over the territorial waters of the SCS, which the other littoral states vehemently reject as there are interlocking claims on some of those islands. Thus there is a bilateral dispute between China and the other claimants over the lordship of these islands and a multilateral dispute over the territorial waters of the sea.

The US is not a bystander in this imbroglio. It is alarmed by China’s assertion of such a vast economic zone and its intention to convert the SCS from international waters to its territorial waters. The US is the pre-eminent maritime trading state with the world’s largest navy. Any attempt to disrupt navigation rights will surely not go unchallenged. This is the cornerstone of US naval policy since the days of the Barbary wars. Up to a third of global trade passes through the SCS, so preserving freedom of navigation is America’s “national interest”. Obviously the US is leery of getting directly  entangled in this row, mainly because it is not a ‘resident entity’ in the SCS area, but has tenaciously stood up for the right of freedom of navigation and overflights. Apart from the commercial and strategic interests, the US has to uphold security commitments to its regional allies. The US has much to gain by being engaged with them because these economically dynamic states have embarked on a military modernization spree, which will invariably benefit the US’ military-industrial-complex in the years ahead.

India may not be a part of the littoral, but in sync with the country’s stable economic growth and expanding global profile, securing oil and gas from all possible sources is an obligation of “national interest”. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the SCS, and the right to passage in accordance with the 2002 declaration of conduct in the sea. On this issue, there is an understandable congruence in Indian and American strategic thinking. For Delhi to safely access the energy resources of the volatile SCS, it must neither confront China nor cave in to its pressure tactics. India’s bulwark against the Chinese threat lies in diversifying its sources of support. India’s sound economic growth gives it the clout to co-opt partners on issues of mutual interests. As part of its ‘Look and Engage East’ Policy, Delhi has forged strategic ties with some of the littoral states, especially with Vietnam. Delhi needs to build on the momentum in existing ties. India must build tactical linkages with the incipient navies of the SCS region for interoperability purposes and help them in capacity-building to combat piracy, weapons smuggling and foiling hegemonic designs in the sea. India can help in defusing a crisis if it maintains warm relationships with all the stake-holders and forcefully articulates the merits of stability and shared prosperity - the only way to tide over any upheaval in the SCS. The Annual Defence Dialogue between India and China and the Strategic Dialogue will go a long way in building confidence and resolving complex issues like China’s objection to OVL’s (ONGC’s overseas arm) oil exploration bid off Vietnam and avert skirmishes like that of 22 July between an Indian and Chinese warship.

Delhi’s initiative to set up the Indian Ports Global is a proactive step to expand India’s maritime footprint. By acquiring ports and terminals in the Asian maritime markets, India can evolve into an indispensable business and strategic partner. The over Rs. 3 lakh crore  modernization plan to build a 3-dimensional blue water Indian Navy, backed by an  IAF with a tactical reach outgrowing it’s traditional zone of interest will help India in asserting its strategic objectives. The new acquisitions will transform the IAF into a ‘network centric’ force with the capacity to rapidly deploy and operate wherever compelled. For India to establish itself as a ‘no-pushover’, an integrated approach between military and diplomacy backed by an unflagging political mandate is the crying need of the hour. China’s difficulties should not be seen as India’s opportunities either. But any rare and ripe opportunity to further the nation’s interests and consolidate its gains should be grabbed with both hands. India’s geostrategic priorities should be guided by pragmatism, progress and principles of power play.

20th Century Timeline 1927 The French ship SS De Lanessan conducted a scientific survey of the Spratly Islands 1930 France launched a second expedition with the La Malicieuse, which raised the French flag on an island called Île de la Tempete. 1932 The Republic of China sent the French government a memorandum contesting their sovereignty over the Paracels, stating that the Paracels were the extreme south of Chinese territories, based on the Chinese interpretation of the 1887 treaty ending the Sino-French War. 1933 Three French ships had taken control of nine of the largest islands and declared French sovereignty over the archipelago to the great powers including the UK, US, China and Japan, according to the principles found in the Berlin convention. 1939 The Empire of Japan disputed French sovereignty over the islands, citing that Japan was the first country to discover the islands. 1941 Japan forcibly occupied the island group and remained in control until the end of World War II, administering the area as part of Taiwan. 1945 At the end of World War II, the Republic of China claimed the Spratly Islands. 1947 China produced a map with 9 undefined dotted lines, and claimed all of the islands within those lines. 1948 France ceased maritime patrols near the islands and China withdrew most of its troops. 1951 At the 1951 San Francisco Conference on the Peace Treaty with Japan, the Soviet Union proposed that the Spratlys belonged to China. This was overwhelmingly rejected by the delegates. The delegates from Vietnam declared sovereignty over the Paracel and the Spratly Islands, which was not opposed by any delegate at the conference. China did not attend the conference and was not a signatory of the treaty. 1956 Tomas Cloma, director of the Maritime Institute of the Philippines, claimed sovereignty over much of the Spratly Islands, naming his territory “Kalaya’an” (“Freedomland”). 1956 Later in the year, South Vietnam declared its annexation of the Spratly Islands as part of its PhýÛc Tuy Province. 1958 The People’s Republic of China issued a declaration defining its territorial waters which encompassed the Spratly Islands. Both the South Vietnamese government and the communist revolutionary movement in South Vietnam continued to assert that the Spratlys belonged to Vietnam. 1961-3 South Vietnam established sovereignty markers on several islands in the chain. 1968 The Philippines sent troops to three islands on the premise of protecting Kalayaan citizens and announced the annexation of the Kalayaan island group. 1971 Malaysia issued claims to some of the Spratly Islands. 1972 The Philippines incorporated the Kalayaan islands into its Palawan province. 1975 The unified Vietnam declared claims over the Spratly Islands. 1978 A presidential decree from the Philippines outlined territorial claims to the islands. 1979 Malaysia published a map of its continental shelf claim, which includes twelve islands from the Spratly group. Vietnam published a white paper outlining its claims to the islands and disputing those of the other claimants. 1982 Vietnam published another white paper, occupied several of the islands and constructed military installations. The Philippines also occupied several more islands and constructed an air strip. 1983 Malaysia occupied Swallow Reef (Layang Layang), one of the Spratly Islands. A naval base and resort was later built at this location. 1987 The People’s Republic of China conducted naval patrols in the Spratly Islands and established a permanent base. 1988 PRC warships and Vietnamese transport ships had a minor clash over Johnson Reef. PRC forces prevailed and the PRC won control over some Spratly reefs for the first time in the dispute. 2008 Taiwan’s President became the first head of state from the claimant countries to visit Spratly islands. His visit sparks criticism from other claimants. 2009 The Office of the Philippine President enacted the “Philippine Baselines Law of 2009” (RA 9522). The new law classifies the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal as a “regime of islands under the Republic of the Philippines.” 2009 A joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam claims jurisdiction over their respective continental shelves out to 200 nautical miles. A lone submission by Vietnam claims jurisdiction over an extended shelf area. The People’s Republic of China and the Philippines both protested the moves stating that they violated agreements made with regards to the islands. 2011 In June, the Chinese navy conducted three days of exercises, including live fire drills, in the disputed waters. This was widely seen as a warning to Vietnam, which had also conducted live fire drills near the Spratly Islands.